Abstract
We study a financial market economy with a continuum of borrowers and pooling of borrowers' promises. Under these conditions and in the absence of designing costs, utility-maximizing decisions of price-taking borrowers may lead to financial market incompleteness. Parametrizing equilibria through the borrowers' no-arbitrage beliefs, we link expectations to the financial market structure. Markets are complete if and only if borrowers' beliefs are homogeneous. Price-taking behavior causes a coordination problem which in turn yields indeterminacy and inefficiency of equilibrium allocations.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 549-560 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2004 |
Keywords
- Endogenous asset formation
- Financial pooling
- Incomplete financial markets
- Indeterminacy of equilibria
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics