TY - JOUR
T1 - Power Side-Channel Attacks in Negative Capacitance Transistor
AU - Knechtel, Johann
AU - Patnaik, Satwik
AU - Nabeel, Mohammed
AU - Ashraf, Mohammed
AU - Chauhan, Yogesh S.
AU - Henkel, Jörg
AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur
AU - Amrouch, Hussam
N1 - Funding Information:
Ozgur Sinanoglu is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering with New York University Abu Dhabi (NYU Abu Dhabi), United Arab Emirates. His recent research in hardware security and trust is being funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Defense, Semiconductor Research Corporation, Intel Corp, and Mubadala Technology. His research interests include design-for-test, design-for-security, and design-for-trust for VLSI circuits, where he has more than 180 conference and journal papers, and 20 issued and pending U.S. patents. Sinanoglu received the Ph.D. degree in computer science and engineering from the University of California at San Diego, CA, USA, in 2004. Contact him at [email protected].
Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the Center for Cyber Security at New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). The work of Satwik Patnaik was supported by the Global Ph.D. Fellowship at NYU/NYUAD. Besides, parts of this work were carried out on the HPC facility at NYUAD. J. Knechtel, S. Patnaik, and M. Nabeel contributed equally to this work.
Publisher Copyright:
© 1981-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/11/1
Y1 - 2020/11/1
N2 - Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their noninvasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art focused on conventional technologies, this is the first work to investigate the emerging negative capacitance transistor (NCFET) technology in the context of PSC attacks. We implement a CAD flow for the PSC evaluation at design time. It leverages industry-standard design tools, while also employing the widely accepted correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. Using standard-cell libraries based on the 7-nm FinFET technology for NCFET and its counterpart CMOS setup, our evaluation reveals that NCFET-based circuits are more resilient to the classical CPA attack, due to the considerable effect of negative capacitance on the switching power. We also demonstrate that the thicker the ferroelectric layer, the higher the resiliency of the NCFET-based circuit, which opens new doors for optimization and tradeoffs.
AB - Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their noninvasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art focused on conventional technologies, this is the first work to investigate the emerging negative capacitance transistor (NCFET) technology in the context of PSC attacks. We implement a CAD flow for the PSC evaluation at design time. It leverages industry-standard design tools, while also employing the widely accepted correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. Using standard-cell libraries based on the 7-nm FinFET technology for NCFET and its counterpart CMOS setup, our evaluation reveals that NCFET-based circuits are more resilient to the classical CPA attack, due to the considerable effect of negative capacitance on the switching power. We also demonstrate that the thicker the ferroelectric layer, the higher the resiliency of the NCFET-based circuit, which opens new doors for optimization and tradeoffs.
KW - Beyond CMOS
KW - CAD for Security
KW - Correlation power analysis (CPA)
KW - Emerging technology
KW - Ferroelectric
KW - NCFET
KW - Negative capacitance
KW - Power side channel (PSC)
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U2 - 10.1109/MM.2020.3005883
DO - 10.1109/MM.2020.3005883
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85087524211
SN - 0272-1732
VL - 40
SP - 74
EP - 84
JO - IEEE Micro
JF - IEEE Micro
IS - 6
M1 - 9131868
ER -