PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE

Olivier Gossner; Christoph Kuzmics

doi:10.1111/iere.12351

PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE

Olivier Gossner, Christoph Kuzmics

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially ignorant of the payoff associated with each alternative and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option, once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives can be rationalized by a DM with strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are “right.”.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	241-257
Number of pages	17
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	60
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12351
State	Published - Feb 1 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/iere.12351

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PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE

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