Abstract
This paper examines the effects of tariffs on price-setting duopolists selling a homogeneous product. The producers cannot segment geographically distinct markets. It provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium (mixed) strategies and analyzes the pattern of competition for different tariffs. If a country raises its tariff, the profits of both producers increase, although the protected firm typically benefits more than its foreign counterpart. Growth in one market may reduce the profits of the firm located in the other market.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 67-87 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1995 |
Keywords
- Anti-dumping
- Commercial policy
- Imperfect competition
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering