Abstract
We examine a model of a monopolist selling to two segments of consumers with different preferences for quality. We show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments, then there is less investment in quality. We find that both consumer segments, and society overall, may suffer if the firm is unable to price discriminate. We extend the model to duopoly competition, and find that our results still hold.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 615-623 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 2012 |
Keywords
- investment
- net neutrality
- parallel trade
- pharmaceuticals
- price discrimination
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering