TY - JOUR
T1 - Price setting and competition in a simple duopoly model
AU - Gale, Douglas
N1 - Funding Information:
*In revising this paper, I benefited from the advice of Eric Maskin and an anonymous referee. Helpful comments were also received from Bentley MacLeod and from seminar participants at the University of Chicago, especially Charles Kahn. None of these are responsible for any remaining deficiencies. Financial support from NSF grant SES 85-20224 is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 1988/11
Y1 - 1988/11
N2 - The paper studies a market in which there are two sellers and one buyer. Each agent wants to trade at most one unit of an indivisible commodity. The sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving offers from one or both of them at any given time. This model induces competitive and monopolistic outcomes for particular parameter values. But, other things being equal, as the buyer becomes very patient, the equilibrium price converges to the competitive one.
AB - The paper studies a market in which there are two sellers and one buyer. Each agent wants to trade at most one unit of an indivisible commodity. The sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving offers from one or both of them at any given time. This model induces competitive and monopolistic outcomes for particular parameter values. But, other things being equal, as the buyer becomes very patient, the equilibrium price converges to the competitive one.
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U2 - 10.2307/1886072
DO - 10.2307/1886072
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0039816572
VL - 103
SP - 729
EP - 739
JO - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JF - Quarterly Journal of Economics
SN - 0033-5533
IS - 4
ER -