TY - JOUR
T1 - Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
AU - Bochet, Olivier
AU - Gordon, Sidartha
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ We thank Anna Bogomolnaia, Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus, Matthew Jackson, François Maniquet, Hervé Moulin, Jorge L. Garcia Ramirez, Jim Schummer, Yves Sprumont, William Thomson and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Part of this paper was written when Olivier Bochet visited Université de Montréal, and when Sidartha Gordon visited Maastricht University and the University of Bern. Financial support from CIREQ and METEOR is gratefully acknowledged. Olivier Bochet thanks, respectively, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and the Swiss Science Foundation (SNF) for their support under grant VENI-451-07-021 and grant 100014-126954. Sidartha Gordon thanks the FQRSC (Québec) for financial support. * Corresponding author at: University of Bern, Switzerland. E-mail address: [email protected] (O. Bochet).
PY - 2012/1
Y1 - 2012/1
N2 - A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
AB - A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
KW - Generalized median voter rules
KW - Hierarchical rules
KW - Multiple public facilities
KW - No-show paradox
KW - Object-population monotonicity
KW - Priority rules
KW - Sovereignty
KW - Strategy-proofness
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84855191814
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 74
SP - 52
EP - 67
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -