Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)52-67
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2012

Keywords

  • Generalized median voter rules
  • Hierarchical rules
  • Multiple public facilities
  • No-show paradox
  • Object-population monotonicity
  • Priority rules
  • Sovereignty
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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