Abstract
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 52-67 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 74 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2012 |
Keywords
- Generalized median voter rules
- Hierarchical rules
- Multiple public facilities
- No-show paradox
- Object-population monotonicity
- Priority rules
- Sovereignty
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics