TY - GEN
T1 - Process-aware side channel monitoring for embedded control system security
AU - Paul-Pena, David
AU - Krishnamurthy, Prashanth
AU - Karri, Ramesh
AU - Khorrami, Farshad
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by Boeing, the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Awards N00014-15-1-2182 and N00014-17-1-2006, and the NYU Center for Cyber Security.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/12/13
Y1 - 2017/12/13
N2 - Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are interconnections of heterogeneous hardware and software components (e.g., sensors, actuators, physical systems/processes, computational nodes and controllers, and communication subsystems). Increasing network connectivity of CPS computational nodes facilitates maintenance and on-demand reprogrammability and reduces operator workload. However, such increasing connectivity also raises the potential for cyber-attacks that attempt unauthorized modifications of run-time parameters or control logic in the computational nodes to hamper process stability or performance. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of real-time monitoring using digital and analog side channels. While analog side channels might not typically provide sufficient granularity to observe each iteration of a periodic loop in the code in the CPS device, the temporal averaging inherent to side channel sensory modalities enables observation of persistent changes to the contents of a computational loop through their resulting effect on the level of activity of the device. Changes to code can be detected by observing readings from side channel sensors over a period of time. Experimental studies are performed on an ARM-based single board computer.
AB - Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are interconnections of heterogeneous hardware and software components (e.g., sensors, actuators, physical systems/processes, computational nodes and controllers, and communication subsystems). Increasing network connectivity of CPS computational nodes facilitates maintenance and on-demand reprogrammability and reduces operator workload. However, such increasing connectivity also raises the potential for cyber-attacks that attempt unauthorized modifications of run-time parameters or control logic in the computational nodes to hamper process stability or performance. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of real-time monitoring using digital and analog side channels. While analog side channels might not typically provide sufficient granularity to observe each iteration of a periodic loop in the code in the CPS device, the temporal averaging inherent to side channel sensory modalities enables observation of persistent changes to the contents of a computational loop through their resulting effect on the level of activity of the device. Changes to code can be detected by observing readings from side channel sensors over a period of time. Experimental studies are performed on an ARM-based single board computer.
KW - Acoustic
KW - Control systems
KW - Monitoring
KW - Security
KW - Side channels
KW - Thermal
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048067055&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85048067055&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2017.8203468
DO - 10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2017.8203468
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85048067055
T3 - IEEE/IFIP International Conference on VLSI and System-on-Chip, VLSI-SoC
BT - 25th IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration, VLSI-SoC 2017 - Proceedings
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 25th IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration, VLSI-SoC 2017
Y2 - 23 October 2017 through 25 October 2017
ER -