Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges

Gaby G. Dagher; Benedikt Bünz; Joseph Bonneau; Jeremy Clark; Dan Boneh

doi:10.1145/2810103.2813674

Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges

Gaby G. Dagher, Benedikt Bünz, Joseph Bonneau, Jeremy Clark, Dan Boneh

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Bitcoin exchanges function like banks, securely holding their customers'bitcoins on their behalf. Several exchanges have suffered catastrophic losses with customers permanently losing their savings. A proof of solvency demonstrates that the exchange controls sufficient reserves to settle each customer's account. We introduce Provisions, a privacy-preserving proof of solvency whereby an exchange does not have to disclose its Bitcoin addresses; total holdings or liabilities; or any information about its customers. We also propose an extension which prevents exchanges from colluding to cover for each other's losses. We have implemented Provisions and it offers practical computation times and proof sizes even for a large Bitcoin exchange with millions of customers.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	720-731
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450338325
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813674
State	Published - Oct 12 2015
Event	22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015 - Denver, United States Duration: Oct 12 2015 → Oct 16 2015

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Volume	2015-October
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Other

Other	22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015
Country/Territory	United States
City	Denver
Period	10/12/15 → 10/16/15

Keywords

Bitcoin
Exchange Services
Solvency
Zero Knowledge Protocols

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1145/2810103.2813674

Cite this

Dagher, G. G., Bünz, B., Bonneau, J., Clark, J., & Boneh, D. (2015). Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges. In CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 720-731). (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security; Vol. 2015-October). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813674

Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges. / Dagher, Gaby G.; Bünz, Benedikt; Bonneau, Joseph et al.
CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, 2015. p. 720-731 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security; Vol. 2015-October).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Dagher, GG, Bünz, B, Bonneau, J, Clark, J & Boneh, D 2015, Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges. in CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, vol. 2015-October, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 720-731, 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015, Denver, United States, 10/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813674

Dagher GG, Bünz B, Bonneau J, Clark J, Boneh D. Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges. In CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery. 2015. p. 720-731. (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security). doi: 10.1145/2810103.2813674

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abstract = "Bitcoin exchanges function like banks, securely holding their customers'bitcoins on their behalf. Several exchanges have suffered catastrophic losses with customers permanently losing their savings. A proof of solvency demonstrates that the exchange controls sufficient reserves to settle each customer's account. We introduce Provisions, a privacy-preserving proof of solvency whereby an exchange does not have to disclose its Bitcoin addresses; total holdings or liabilities; or any information about its customers. We also propose an extension which prevents exchanges from colluding to cover for each other's losses. We have implemented Provisions and it offers practical computation times and proof sizes even for a large Bitcoin exchange with millions of customers.",

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note = "Funding Information: We thank the reviewers for their insights. We especially thank our shepherd Sarah Meiklejohn for her constructive feedback and contributions which improved the paper. J. Bonneau is supported by a Secure Usability Fellowship from the Open Technology Fund and Simply Secure as well and is also supported by DARPA. J. Clark acknowledges funding from NSERC, FQRNT and Concordia OVPRGS. D. Boneh acknowledges funding from NSF, DARPA, and a grant from ONR. Opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DARPA.; 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015 ; Conference date: 12-10-2015 Through 16-10-2015",

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N1 - Funding Information: We thank the reviewers for their insights. We especially thank our shepherd Sarah Meiklejohn for her constructive feedback and contributions which improved the paper. J. Bonneau is supported by a Secure Usability Fellowship from the Open Technology Fund and Simply Secure as well and is also supported by DARPA. J. Clark acknowledges funding from NSERC, FQRNT and Concordia OVPRGS. D. Boneh acknowledges funding from NSF, DARPA, and a grant from ONR. Opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DARPA.

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Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges

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Keywords

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