Abstract
A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. Approximately one quarter of all punishments are retaliated. Counter-punishments appear to be driven partly by strategic considerations and partly by a desire to reciprocate punishments.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 91-112 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 92 |
Issue number | 1-2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2008 |
Keywords
- Counter-punishment
- Decentralized punishment
- Experimental economics
- Public goods
- Revenge
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics