TY - JOUR
T1 - Putting the trolley in order
T2 - Experimental philosophy and the loop case
AU - Liao, S. Matthew
AU - Wiegmann, Alex
AU - Alexander, Joshua
AU - Vong, Gerard
N1 - Funding Information:
Each author contributed equally to this project. We would like to thank Michael Otsuka, Regina Rini, and audiences at the Metro Experimental Research Group Metaethics Workshop at NYU, the 36th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and Duke University’s Moral Psychology Group for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks are also due to Jonas Kahle for setting up the online experiment. Alex Wiegmann was supported by a grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG WA 621/21-1), and the Courant Research Centre ‘‘Evolution of Social Behaviour’’, University of Göttingen (funded by the German Initiative of Excellence).
PY - 2012/10
Y1 - 2012/10
N2 - In recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. We found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We contend that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for philosophers who rely on the Loop Case to make philosophical arguments and for philosophers who use intuitions in general.
AB - In recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. We found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We contend that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for philosophers who rely on the Loop Case to make philosophical arguments and for philosophers who use intuitions in general.
KW - Doctrine of Double Effect
KW - Experimental Philosophy
KW - Frances Kamm
KW - Intuitions
KW - Judith Jarvis Thompson
KW - Trolley Cases
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U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2011.627536
DO - 10.1080/09515089.2011.627536
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84864718468
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 25
SP - 661
EP - 671
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 5
ER -