Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called 'cheap talk signaling games' capture the dynamic and information-asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. In this paper, we investigate a model of signaling games in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability. This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. Then we illustrate these analytical results with an application to active network defense. The presence of evidence forces majority-truthful behavior and eliminates some pure strategy equilibria. It always benefits the deceived player, but surprisingly sometimes also benefits the deceiving player.