R&D networks

Sanjeev Goyal, José Luis Moraga-González

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)686-707
Number of pages22
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'R&D networks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this