TY - JOUR
T1 - Reactions to discrimination in an incentive pay compensation scheme
T2 - A game-theoretic approach
AU - Weigelt, Keith
AU - Dukerich, Janet
AU - Schotter, Andrew
N1 - Funding Information:
Thanks to Art Brief, Mike Burke, Rob Folger, Tom Ostrom, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the NYU Management seminar for helpful comments and suggestions. This research was funded by the C.V. Starr Center. Requests for reprints should be sent to the current address of Keith Weigelt at: Department of Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. 26
PY - 1989/8
Y1 - 1989/8
N2 - In a series of experiments with undergraduate business students, some behavioral consequences of discrimination in an incentive compensation scheme were investigated. A game-theoretic approach was used to predict the choices subjects should make if they attempted to maximize monetary outcomes. Subjects, who were assigned to either an advantaged or disadvantaged condition, participated in an experiment in which they earned money based on their chosen decisions. The decision choices of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups were then compared to the predicted choices from the game-theory model. The results supported the predictions from the theory of tournaments only in the symmetric tournament, where there was no discrimination. When discrimination was introduced into the experiment, the observed choices of both advantaged and disadvantaged subjects were significantly greater than that predicted by the theory.
AB - In a series of experiments with undergraduate business students, some behavioral consequences of discrimination in an incentive compensation scheme were investigated. A game-theoretic approach was used to predict the choices subjects should make if they attempted to maximize monetary outcomes. Subjects, who were assigned to either an advantaged or disadvantaged condition, participated in an experiment in which they earned money based on their chosen decisions. The decision choices of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups were then compared to the predicted choices from the game-theory model. The results supported the predictions from the theory of tournaments only in the symmetric tournament, where there was no discrimination. When discrimination was introduced into the experiment, the observed choices of both advantaged and disadvantaged subjects were significantly greater than that predicted by the theory.
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U2 - 10.1016/0749-5978(89)90033-2
DO - 10.1016/0749-5978(89)90033-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249005079
SN - 0749-5978
VL - 44
SP - 26
EP - 44
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
IS - 1
ER -