Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter

Marco Bassetto, Jess Benhabib

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)211-223
    Number of pages13
    JournalReview of Economic Dynamics
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Apr 2006


    • Capital income taxes
    • Gorman aggregation
    • Median voter
    • Redistribution

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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