Abstract
We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 211-223 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Review of Economic Dynamics |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2006 |
Keywords
- Capital income taxes
- Gorman aggregation
- Median voter
- Redistribution
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics