TY - JOUR
T1 - Regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs
AU - Crès, Hervé
AU - Tvede, Mich
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2018/1
Y1 - 2018/1
N2 - Some trades based on differences in beliefs might cause more harm than good. Should they be restricted? If yes, how? We propose three properties ensuring that regulation does not prevent beneficial trade and is consistent: Unanimity – the regulator should not object to trades with identical beliefs; Merge-Proofness of Autarky – if the regulator does not object to finitely many unrelated trades, all with identical beliefs, then it should not object to the mere juxtaposition of the trades; and Independence of Irrelevant Trade – if the regulator does not object to the juxtaposition of two unrelated trades, then it should not object to any of the two trades standing alone. We show that there is a unique policy having these three properties, namely laissez-faire.
AB - Some trades based on differences in beliefs might cause more harm than good. Should they be restricted? If yes, how? We propose three properties ensuring that regulation does not prevent beneficial trade and is consistent: Unanimity – the regulator should not object to trades with identical beliefs; Merge-Proofness of Autarky – if the regulator does not object to finitely many unrelated trades, all with identical beliefs, then it should not object to the mere juxtaposition of the trades; and Independence of Irrelevant Trade – if the regulator does not object to the juxtaposition of two unrelated trades, then it should not object to any of the two trades standing alone. We show that there is a unique policy having these three properties, namely laissez-faire.
KW - Heterogeneous beliefs
KW - Pareto efficiency
KW - Regulation
KW - Speculative trading
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85033609647&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.001
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85033609647
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 101
SP - 133
EP - 141
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
ER -