TY - JOUR
T1 - Reluctant regulation
AU - Bortolotti, Bernardo
AU - Cambini, Carlo
AU - Rondi, Laura
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the Editor, Gérard Roland, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. We also thank Daniel Albalate, Luigi Benfratello, Eshien Chong, Axel Gautier, Riccardo Martina, Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Martin Peitz, Russell W. Pittman, Yossi Spiegel, Pablo T. Spiller, Carine Staropoli, Francesca Stroffolini, and seminars participants at the 2009 EEA Annual Meeting in Barcelona, the 2011 CDP Private Equity for Infrastructure Workshop in Rome, the European University Institute (EUI) – Florence, the Annual Meeting of the Law and Economics Association, the Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) – University of Paris I, the 4th NERI Workshop in Turin, the 2012 World Congress of the Public Choice Society in Miami, the PRIN Workshop on New Industrial Policy in Anacapri (Naples), the 13th Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Regulatory Conference 2012 in Brisbane (AUS) and the 39th EARIE Annual Conference in Rome, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Bernardo Bortolotti gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Commission (Contract No. CIT5-CT-2005-028647). Carlo Cambini and Laura Rondi gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education (No. 20089PYFHY_004).
PY - 2013/8
Y1 - 2013/8
N2 - We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership seems positively associated with firm value. This relation tends to appear in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. Our results suggest that, where political institutions are weak, politicians may influence regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.
AB - We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership seems positively associated with firm value. This relation tends to appear in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. Our results suggest that, where political institutions are weak, politicians may influence regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.
KW - Firm value
KW - Political institutions
KW - Privatization
KW - Regulatory independence
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84880798862
VL - 41
SP - 804
EP - 828
JO - Journal of Comparative Economics
JF - Journal of Comparative Economics
SN - 0147-5967
IS - 3
ER -