Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Kemal Kivanç Aköz; Pablo Hernández-Lagos

doi:10.1111/sjpe.12205

Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Kemal Kivanç Aköz, Pablo Hernández-Lagos

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent-seeking activities.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	584-604
Number of pages	21
Journal	Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Volume	66
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12205
State	Published - Sep 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1111/sjpe.12205

Cite this

@article{8865d767d81a4a01b7651270f1fb312d,

title = "Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization",

abstract = "Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent{\textquoteright}s rent-seeking activities.",

author = "Ak{\"o}z, {Kemal Kivan{\c c}} and Pablo Hern{\'a}ndez-Lagos",

note = "Funding Information: We thank to an anonymous referee, James Alt, Ernesto Dal B{\'o}, Helios Herrera, John Leahy, Dylan Minor, Mehdi Shadmehr, and David Stasavage as well as the participants of seminars at the American University of Sharjah, Bilkent University, Bogazici University, and New York University Abu Dhabi for valuable discussions. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Scottish Economic Society",

year = "2019",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1111/sjpe.12205",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "66",

pages = "584--604",

journal = "Scottish Journal of Political Economy",

issn = "0036-9292",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

AU - Aköz, Kemal Kivanç

AU - Hernández-Lagos, Pablo

N1 - Funding Information: We thank to an anonymous referee, James Alt, Ernesto Dal Bó, Helios Herrera, John Leahy, Dylan Minor, Mehdi Shadmehr, and David Stasavage as well as the participants of seminars at the American University of Sharjah, Bilkent University, Bogazici University, and New York University Abu Dhabi for valuable discussions. Publisher Copyright: © 2018 Scottish Economic Society

PY - 2019/9

Y1 - 2019/9

N2 - Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent-seeking activities.

AB - Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent-seeking activities.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058012480&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85058012480&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/sjpe.12205

DO - 10.1111/sjpe.12205

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85058012480

SN - 0036-9292

VL - 66

SP - 584

EP - 604

JO - Scottish Journal of Political Economy

JF - Scottish Journal of Political Economy

IS - 4

ER -

Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this