Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Olivier Gossner; Nicolas Vieille

doi:10.1007/s001820100063

Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Olivier Gossner, Nicolas Vieille

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	41-60
Number of pages	20
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	30
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100063
State	Published - Sep 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s001820100063

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Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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