Repeated two-player games with ruin

A. W. Rosenthal, A. Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    The class of repeated two-player games (with long-run average payoff criterion) is extended to accommodate initial holdings of wealth and the possibility of ruin. Equilibria of these games are studied under the assumption that each player regards his own ruin as the worst possible outcome of the game and his opponent's ruin as the best possible outcome.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)155-177
    Number of pages23
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Volume13
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 1984

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics and Probability
    • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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