Repeated two-player games with ruin

A. W. Rosenthal; A. Rubinstein

doi:10.1007/BF01769813

Repeated two-player games with ruin

A. W. Rosenthal, A. Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The class of repeated two-player games (with long-run average payoff criterion) is extended to accommodate initial holdings of wealth and the possibility of ruin. Equilibria of these games are studied under the assumption that each player regards his own ruin as the worst possible outcome of the game and his opponent's ruin as the best possible outcome.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	155-177
Number of pages	23
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	13
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769813
State	Published - Sep 1984

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/BF01769813

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Repeated two-player games with ruin

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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