Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

Daniel Houser, John Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)353-369
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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