Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

Daniel Houser; John Wooders

doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

Daniel Houser, John Wooders

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	353-369
Number of pages	17
Journal	Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume	15
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x
State	Published - Jun 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Business, Management and Accounting
Economics and Econometrics
Strategy and Management
Management of Technology and Innovation

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10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

Cite this

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abstract = "Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.",

author = "Daniel Houser and John Wooders",

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Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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