Resource sharing among mmWave cellular service providers in a vertically differentiated duopoly

Fraida Fund, Shahram Shahsavari, Shivendra S. Panwar, Elza Erkip, Sundeep Rangan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

With the increasing interest in the use of millimeter wave bands for 5G cellular systems comes renewed interest in resource sharing. Properties of millimeter wave bands such as massive bandwidth, highly directional antennas, high penetration loss, and susceptibility to shadowing, suggest technical advantages to spectrum and infrastructure sharing in millimeter wave cellular networks. However, technical advantages do not necessarily translate to increased profit for service providers, or increased consumer surplus. In this paper, detailed network simulations are used to better understand the economic implications of resource sharing in a vertically differentiated duopoly market for cellular service. The results suggest that resource sharing is less often profitable for millimeter wave service providers compared to microwave cellular service providers, and does not necessarily increase consumer surplus.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2017
EditorsMerouane Debbah, David Gesbert, Abdelhamid Mellouk
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781467389990
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 28 2017
Event2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2017 - Paris, France
Duration: May 21 2017May 25 2017

Publication series

NameIEEE International Conference on Communications
ISSN (Print)1550-3607

Other

Other2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2017
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityParis
Period5/21/175/25/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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