TY - GEN
T1 - Rethinking split manufacturing
T2 - 36th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2017
AU - Sengupta, Abhrajit
AU - Patnaik, Satwik
AU - Knechtel, Johann
AU - Ashraf, Mohammed
AU - Garg, Siddharth
AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant 1553419, the Computing and Communication Foundations (NSF/CCF) under Grant 1319841, a grant from the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC), and the New York University/New York University Abu Dhabi (NYU/NYUAD) Center for Cyber Security (CCS). Any views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF or SRC.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/12/13
Y1 - 2017/12/13
N2 - Split manufacturing is a promising technique to defend against fab-based malicious activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, a network flow-based proximity attack, proposed by Wang et al. (DAC'16) [1], has demonstrated that most prior art on split manufacturing is highly vulnerable. Here in this work, we present two practical layout techniques towards secure split manufacturing: (i) gate-level graph coloring and (ii) clustering of same-type gates. Our approach shows promising results against the advanced proximity attack, lowering its success rate by 5.27x, 3.19x, and 1.73x on average compared to the unprotected layouts when splitting at metal layers M1, M2, and M3, respectively. Also, it largely outperforms previous defense efforts; we observe on average 8x higher resilience when compared to representative prior art. At the same time, extensive simulations on ISCAS'85 and MCNC benchmarks reveal that our techniques incur an acceptable layout overhead. Apart from this empirical study, we provide - for the first time - a theoretical framework for quantifying the layout-level resilience against any proximity-induced information leakage. Towards this end, we leverage the notion of mutual information and provide extensive results to validate our model.
AB - Split manufacturing is a promising technique to defend against fab-based malicious activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, a network flow-based proximity attack, proposed by Wang et al. (DAC'16) [1], has demonstrated that most prior art on split manufacturing is highly vulnerable. Here in this work, we present two practical layout techniques towards secure split manufacturing: (i) gate-level graph coloring and (ii) clustering of same-type gates. Our approach shows promising results against the advanced proximity attack, lowering its success rate by 5.27x, 3.19x, and 1.73x on average compared to the unprotected layouts when splitting at metal layers M1, M2, and M3, respectively. Also, it largely outperforms previous defense efforts; we observe on average 8x higher resilience when compared to representative prior art. At the same time, extensive simulations on ISCAS'85 and MCNC benchmarks reveal that our techniques incur an acceptable layout overhead. Apart from this empirical study, we provide - for the first time - a theoretical framework for quantifying the layout-level resilience against any proximity-induced information leakage. Towards this end, we leverage the notion of mutual information and provide extensive results to validate our model.
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U2 - 10.1109/ICCAD.2017.8203796
DO - 10.1109/ICCAD.2017.8203796
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85043499993
T3 - IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD
SP - 329
EP - 336
BT - 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 13 November 2017 through 16 November 2017
ER -