@article{f8370884a0a54833923339bf747ef16d,
title = "Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation",
abstract = "We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically-and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.",
keywords = "Cooperation, Repeated games, Reputation building, Strong reciprocity",
author = "Ernesto Reuben and Sigrid Suetens",
note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgements We thank John Duffy, Tore Ellingsen, Dirk Engelmann, Guillaume R. Fr{\'e}chette, Simon G{\"a}chter, Mark Isaac, Charles Noussair, Jan Potters, Arno Riedl, seminar participants at the University of Nottingham, Tilburg University, and WZB Berlin, and participants of the 2007 International ESA Meeting and the 2008 Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics for useful suggestions. We also thank the University of Antwerp for financial support. A previous version of this paper was distributed under the title “Conditional cooperation: Disentangling strategic from non-strategic motivations.” Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.",
year = "2012",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1007/s10683-011-9286-4",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "15",
pages = "24--43",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "1",
}