Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions

Nirvan Tyagi, Arasu Arun, Cody Freitag, Riad Wahby, Joseph Bonneau, David Mazières

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if n − 1 bidders collude to try to learn the nth bidder's bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum-compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCCS 2023 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages1227-1241
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9798400700507
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 15 2023
Event30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2023 - Copenhagen, Denmark
Duration: Nov 26 2023Nov 30 2023

Publication series

NameCCS 2023 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Conference

Conference30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2023
Country/TerritoryDenmark
CityCopenhagen
Period11/26/2311/30/23

Keywords

  • auctions
  • blockchains
  • range proofs
  • timed commitments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Software

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