Robust stochastic stability

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Nick Netzer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius–coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)31-57
Number of pages27
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume58
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 3 2015

Keywords

  • Imitation
  • Learning in games
  • Logit-response dynamics
  • Mutations
  • Radius–coradius theorems
  • Stochastic stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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