Rolling Horizon Games for Cluster Formation of Resilient Multiagent Systems

In this paper we formulate a two-player gametheoretic problem on resilient graphs in a multiagent consensus setting. An attacker is capable to disable some of the edges of the network with the objective to divide the agents into clusters by emitting jamming signals while, in response, the defender recovers some of the edges by increasing the transmission power for the communication signals. We consider repeated games between the attacker and the defender where the optimal strategies for the two players are derived in a rolling horizon fashion based on the agents' states and number of agents in each cluster. The players' actions at each discrete-time steps are constrained by their energy for transmissions of signals, with a less strict constraint for the attacker. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effects of players' actions on the cluster formation and to illustrate the performance comparison with a non-rolling horizon approach.