Abstract
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 434-441 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 2003 |
Keywords
- Bounded rationality
- Sampling equilibrium
- Strategic voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics