Satisfaction Approval Voting

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


    Approval voting (AV) system is well suited to elect a single winner, which almost all the literature on AV since the 1970s has addressed. Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) works as follows when the candidates are individuals. A voter's satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected, whether the voter is relatively discriminating or not. This chapter considers the conditions under which, in a 3-candidate election with 2 candidates to be elected, a voter's ballot might change the outcome, either by making or breaking a tie. In 2003, the Game Theory Society used AV for the first time to elect 12 new council members from a list of 24 candidates. A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies under SAV, except approving of a least-preferred candidate, are undominated, so voters may rationally choose to approve of more than one candidate.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationMathematical and Computational Modeling
    Subtitle of host publicationWith Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts
    Number of pages24
    ISBN (Electronic)9781118853986
    ISBN (Print)9781118853887
    StatePublished - May 8 2015


    • Decision-theoretic analysis
    • Game theory society
    • Political parties
    • Satisfaction approval voting

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • General Mathematics
    • General Physics and Astronomy
    • General Chemistry
    • General Computer Science


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