Abstract
Approval voting (AV) system is well suited to elect a single winner, which almost all the literature on AV since the 1970s has addressed. Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) works as follows when the candidates are individuals. A voter's satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected, whether the voter is relatively discriminating or not. This chapter considers the conditions under which, in a 3-candidate election with 2 candidates to be elected, a voter's ballot might change the outcome, either by making or breaking a tie. In 2003, the Game Theory Society used AV for the first time to elect 12 new council members from a list of 24 candidates. A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies under SAV, except approving of a least-preferred candidate, are undominated, so voters may rationally choose to approve of more than one candidate.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Mathematical and Computational Modeling |
Subtitle of host publication | With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts |
Publisher | Wiley |
Pages | 275-298 |
Number of pages | 24 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781118853986 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781118853887 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 8 2015 |
Keywords
- Decision-theoretic analysis
- Game theory society
- Political parties
- Satisfaction approval voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Mathematics(all)
- Physics and Astronomy(all)
- Chemistry(all)
- Computer Science(all)