Satisfaction Approval Voting

Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour

doi:10.1002/9781118853887.ch11

Satisfaction Approval Voting

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Approval voting (AV) system is well suited to elect a single winner, which almost all the literature on AV since the 1970s has addressed. Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) works as follows when the candidates are individuals. A voter's satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected, whether the voter is relatively discriminating or not. This chapter considers the conditions under which, in a 3-candidate election with 2 candidates to be elected, a voter's ballot might change the outcome, either by making or breaking a tie. In 2003, the Game Theory Society used AV for the first time to elect 12 new council members from a list of 24 candidates. A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies under SAV, except approving of a least-preferred candidate, are undominated, so voters may rationally choose to approve of more than one candidate.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Mathematical and Computational Modeling
Subtitle of host publication	With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts
Publisher	Wiley
Pages	275-298
Number of pages	24
ISBN (Electronic)	9781118853986
ISBN (Print)	9781118853887
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118853887.ch11
State	Published - May 8 2015

Keywords

Decision-theoretic analysis
Game theory society
Political parties
Satisfaction approval voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Mathematics(all)
Physics and Astronomy(all)
Chemistry(all)
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1002/9781118853887.ch11

Cite this

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Satisfaction Approval Voting

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Keywords

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