TY - GEN
T1 - Scaling-Up the Crowd
T2 - 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014
AU - Difallah, Djellel Eddine
AU - Catasta, Michele
AU - Demartini, Gianluca
AU - Cudré-Mauroux, Philippe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© HCOMP 2014. All rights reserved.
PY - 2014/11/5
Y1 - 2014/11/5
N2 - Retaining workers on micro-task crowdsourcing platforms is essential in order to guarantee the timely completion of batches of Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Worker retention is also a necessary condition for the introduction of SLAs on crowdsourcing platforms. In this paper, we introduce novel pricing schemes aimed at improving the retention rate of workers working on long batches of similar tasks. We show how increasing or decreasing the monetary reward over time influences the number of tasks a worker is willing to complete in a batch, as well as how it influences the overall latency. We compare our new pricing schemes against traditional pricing methods (e.g., constant reward for all the HITs in a batch) and empirically show how certain schemes effectively function as an incentive for workers to keep working longer on a given batch of HITs. Our experimental results show that the best pricing scheme in terms of worker retention is based on punctual bonuses paid whenever the workers reach predefined milestones.
AB - Retaining workers on micro-task crowdsourcing platforms is essential in order to guarantee the timely completion of batches of Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Worker retention is also a necessary condition for the introduction of SLAs on crowdsourcing platforms. In this paper, we introduce novel pricing schemes aimed at improving the retention rate of workers working on long batches of similar tasks. We show how increasing or decreasing the monetary reward over time influences the number of tasks a worker is willing to complete in a batch, as well as how it influences the overall latency. We compare our new pricing schemes against traditional pricing methods (e.g., constant reward for all the HITs in a batch) and empirically show how certain schemes effectively function as an incentive for workers to keep working longer on a given batch of HITs. Our experimental results show that the best pricing scheme in terms of worker retention is based on punctual bonuses paid whenever the workers reach predefined milestones.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072829610&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85072829610
T3 - Proceedings of the 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014
SP - 50
EP - 58
BT - Proceedings of the 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014
A2 - Bigham, Jeffrey P.
A2 - Parkes, David
PB - AAAI press
Y2 - 2 November 2014 through 4 November 2014
ER -