Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA

Muhammad Yasin; Bodhisatwa Mazumdar; Sk Subidh Ali; Ozgur Sinanoglu

doi:10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143

Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA

Muhammad Yasin, Bodhisatwa Mazumdar, Sk Subidh Ali, Ozgur Sinanoglu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Logic encryption has recently gained interest as a countermeasure against IP piracy and reverse engineering attacks. A secret key is used to lock/encrypt an IC such that the IC will not be functional without being activated with the correct key. Existing attacks against logic encryption are of theoretical and/or algorithmic nature. In this paper, we evaluate for the first time the security of logic encryption against side-channel attacks. We present a differential power analysis attack against random and strong logic encryption techniques. The proposed attack is highly effective against random logic encryption, revealing more than 70% of the key bits correctly in 50% of the circuits. However, in the case of strong logic encryption, which exhibits an inherent DPA-resistance, the attack could reveal more than 50% of the key bits in only 25% of the circuits.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	97-102
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509003129
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143
State	Published - Nov 2 2015
Event	28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015 - Amherst, United States Duration: Oct 12 2015 → Oct 14 2015

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015

Other

Other	28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015
Country/Territory	United States
City	Amherst
Period	10/12/15 → 10/14/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Access to Document

10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143

Cite this

Yasin, M., Mazumdar, B., Ali, S. S., & Sinanoglu, O. (2015). Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015 (pp. 97-102). Article 7315143 (Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143

Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA. / Yasin, Muhammad; Mazumdar, Bodhisatwa; Ali, Sk Subidh et al.
Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 97-102 7315143 (Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Yasin, M, Mazumdar, B, Ali, SS & Sinanoglu, O 2015, Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA. in Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015., 7315143, Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 97-102, 28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015, Amherst, United States, 10/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143

Yasin M, Mazumdar B, Ali SS, Sinanoglu O. Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 97-102. 7315143. (Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015). doi: 10.1109/DFT.2015.7315143

Yasin, Muhammad ; Mazumdar, Bodhisatwa ; Ali, Sk Subidh et al. / Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack : DPA. Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 97-102 (Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015).

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Security analysis of logic encryption against the most effective side-channel attack: DPA

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