TY - JOUR
T1 - Security Assessment of Micro-Electrode-Dot-Array Biochips
AU - Shayan, Mohammed
AU - Tang, Jack
AU - Chakrabarty, Krishnendu
AU - Karri, Ramesh
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received November 28, 2017; revised February 23, 2018, May 24, 2018, and July 13, 2018; accepted July 24, 2018. Date of publication August 8, 2018; date of current version September 18, 2019. This work was supported in part by the Army Research Office (ARO) under Grant ARO W911NF-17-1-0320, in part by the NYU Center for Cyber Security, and in part by the NYU-AD Center for Cyber Security. This paper was recommended by Associate Editor S. Pasricha. (Corresponding author: Mohammed Shayan.) M. Shayan, J. Tang, and R. Karri are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY 11201 USA (e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]).
Publisher Copyright:
© 1982-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2019/10
Y1 - 2019/10
N2 - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) are versatile, reconfigurable systems for manipulating discrete fluid droplets. Building on the success of DMFBs, platforms based on 'sea-of-electrodes,' the micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA), has been proposed to further increase scalability and reconfigurability. Research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to actuation tampering attacks which alter control signals and result in fluid manipulation; such attacks have yet to be studied in the context of MEDA biochips. In this paper, we assess the security of MEDA biochips under such attacks, and further argue that it is inherently a more secure platform than traditional DMFBs. First, we identify a new class of actuation tampering attacks specific to MEDA biochips: the micro-droplet attack. We show that this new attack is stealthy as it produces a subtler difference in results compared to traditional DMFBs. We then illustrate our findings through a case study of an MEDA biochip implementing a glucose measurement assay. Second, we enumerate the system features required to secure an MEDA biochip against actuation tampering attacks and show that these features are naturally implemented in MEDA.
AB - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) are versatile, reconfigurable systems for manipulating discrete fluid droplets. Building on the success of DMFBs, platforms based on 'sea-of-electrodes,' the micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA), has been proposed to further increase scalability and reconfigurability. Research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to actuation tampering attacks which alter control signals and result in fluid manipulation; such attacks have yet to be studied in the context of MEDA biochips. In this paper, we assess the security of MEDA biochips under such attacks, and further argue that it is inherently a more secure platform than traditional DMFBs. First, we identify a new class of actuation tampering attacks specific to MEDA biochips: the micro-droplet attack. We show that this new attack is stealthy as it produces a subtler difference in results compared to traditional DMFBs. We then illustrate our findings through a case study of an MEDA biochip implementing a glucose measurement assay. Second, we enumerate the system features required to secure an MEDA biochip against actuation tampering attacks and show that these features are naturally implemented in MEDA.
KW - Capacitive sensors
KW - cyber-physical systems
KW - microfluidics
KW - security
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U2 - 10.1109/TCAD.2018.2864249
DO - 10.1109/TCAD.2018.2864249
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051412438
SN - 0278-0070
VL - 38
SP - 1831
EP - 1843
JO - IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
IS - 10
M1 - 8429246
ER -