Selection institutions and war aims

James D. Morrow; Bruce Bueno De Mesquita; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith

doi:10.1007/s10101-005-0108-z

Selection institutions and war aims

James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	31-52
Number of pages	22
Journal	Economics of Governance
Volume	7
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-005-0108-z
State	Published - Jan 2006

Keywords

Interstate conflict
Postwar commitment problem
War aims
Winning coalition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Business and International Management

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10.1007/s10101-005-0108-z

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N2 - We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.

AB - We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.

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Selection institutions and war aims

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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