Self-Enforcing Democracy

Adam Przeworski

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0017

Self-Enforcing Democracy

Adam Przeworski

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This article examines the conditions under which a self-enforcing democracy would last. A summary of the early nineteenth-century views according to which democracy could not last because it was a mortal threat to property is provided in the first section. The article then summarizes two models that are motivated by a possibility regarding the insufficiency of the degree of income redistribution. Finally, interpretations and extensions of self-enforcing democracy are discussed.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780191577437
ISBN (Print)	9780199548477
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0017
State	Published - Jun 19 2008

Keywords

Extensions
Income redistribution
Inefficiency
Interpretations
Models
Self-enforcing democracy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Social Sciences

Access to Document

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0017

Cite this

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Self-Enforcing Democracy

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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