Self-Enforcing Democracy

Adam Przeworski

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    This article examines the conditions under which a self-enforcing democracy would last. A summary of the early nineteenth-century views according to which democracy could not last because it was a mortal threat to property is provided in the first section. The article then summarizes two models that are motivated by a possibility regarding the insufficiency of the degree of income redistribution. Finally, interpretations and extensions of self-enforcing democracy are discussed.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Electronic)9780191577437
    ISBN (Print)9780199548477
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 19 2008

    Keywords

    • Extensions
    • Income redistribution
    • Inefficiency
    • Interpretations
    • Models
    • Self-enforcing democracy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)

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