Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

Christopher Phelan; Ennio Stacchetti

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00255

Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

Christopher Phelan, Ennio Stacchetti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1491-1518
Number of pages	28
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	69
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00255
State	Published - 2001

Keywords

Capital taxation
Government credibility
Recursive methods
Time consistent government policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1111/1468-0262.00255

Cite this

@article{2e5503ecb030497bada4f16ce55e940f,

title = "Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model",

abstract = "This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.",

keywords = "Capital taxation, Government credibility, Recursive methods, Time consistent government policy",

author = "Christopher Phelan and Ennio Stacchetti",

year = "2001",

doi = "10.1111/1468-0262.00255",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "69",

pages = "1491--1518",

journal = "Econometrica",

issn = "0012-9682",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

AU - Phelan, Christopher

AU - Stacchetti, Ennio

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.

AB - This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.

KW - Capital taxation

KW - Government credibility

KW - Recursive methods

KW - Time consistent government policy

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0141727344&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0141727344&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1468-0262.00255

DO - 10.1111/1468-0262.00255

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0141727344

SN - 0012-9682

VL - 69

SP - 1491

EP - 1518

JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

IS - 6

ER -

Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this