Set-Theoretic Detection of Bias Injection Cyber-Attacks on Networked Power Systems

Efstathios Kontouras, Anthony Tzes, Leonidas Dritsas

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper addresses the concept of a set-theoretic framework for the detection of bias injection cyber-attacks on the load frequency control loop of a networked power system. The proposed attack detection mechanism is based on the use of convex and compact polyhedral robust invariant sets. An alarm signal is triggered whenever the state vector exits the invariant sets, indicating a potential security breach. The attack scenario studied involves the transmission of corrupted frequency sensor measurements to the automatic generation control unit of a compromised control area. Simulation studies demonstrate the ability of a set-theoretic detector to disclose intermittent attack patterns even in the presence of disturbances.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages165-170
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781538654286
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 9 2018
Event2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 - Milwauke, United States
Duration: Jun 27 2018Jun 29 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
Volume2018-June
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityMilwauke
Period6/27/186/29/18

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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