Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips

Mohammed Shayan, Sukanta Bhattacharjee, Tung Che Liang, Jack Tang, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The Micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) platform that supports fine-grained control and real-time sensing of droplet movements. These capabilities permit continuous monitoring and checkpoint-based validation of assay execution on MEDA. This paper presents a class of "shadow attacks" that abuse the timing slack in the assay execution. State-of-the-art checkpoint-based validation techniques cannot expose the shadow operations. We develop a defense that introduces extra checkpoints in the assay execution at time instances when the assay is prone to shadow attacks. Experiments confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the defense.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781450359504
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 5 2018
Event37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - San Diego, United States
Duration: Nov 5 2018Nov 8 2018

Publication series

NameIEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD
ISSN (Print)1092-3152

Other

Other37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period11/5/1811/8/18

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design

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