@article{2e22767353c8443caa71939762e3b96a,
title = "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture",
abstract = "We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue {\textquoteleft}bubbles up{\textquoteright} in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.",
keywords = "Geometric rules, Hierarchies, Joint ventures, MIT strategy, Resource allocation",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and Moreno-Ternero, {Juan D.} and Mich Tvede and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter}",
note = "Funding Information: We thank two anonymous referees, Biung-Ghi Ju, Fran{\c c}ois Maniquet, Herv{\'e} Moulin, Ariel Procaccia, Peter Sudh{\"o}lter, William Thomson, and audiences at Amherst, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Dallas, Glasgow, Honolulu, London, Louvain-la-Neuve, Lund, Rochester, Seoul, Seville, St. Petersburg and Tokyo for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Council for Strategic Research , the Danish Council for Independent Research ( 6109-0013B ) and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ( ECO2014-57413-P ) is gratefully acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "102",
pages = "98--110",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}