Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects

Paula Onuchic, Debraj Ray

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public’s credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23).

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)210-252
    Number of pages43
    JournalAmerican Economic Review
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Jan 2023

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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