Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations

Manxi Wu, Li Jin, Saurabh Amin, Patrick Jaillet

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting highway operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning. In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles who can exploit the security vulnerabilities in V2I communications and negatively impact the highway operations. We consider a V2I-enabled highway segment facing two classes of vehicles (agent populations), each with an authorized access to one server (subset of lanes). Vehicles are strategic in that they can misreport their class (type) to the system operator and get an unauthorized access to the server dedicated to the other class. This misbehavior causes additional congestion externality on the compliant vehicles, and thus, needs to be deterred. We focus on an environment where the operator is able to inspect the vehicles for misbehavior. The inspection is costly and successful detection incurs a fine on the misbehaving vehicle. We formulate a signaling game to study the strategic interaction between the vehicle classes and the operator. Our equilibrium analysis provides conditions on the cost parameters that govern the vehicles' incentive to misbehave or not. We also determine the operator's equilibrium inspection strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2728-2734
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781538613955
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 18 2019
Event57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018 - Miami, United States
Duration: Dec 17 2018Dec 19 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2018-December
ISSN (Print)0743-1546

Conference

Conference57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityMiami
Period12/17/1812/19/18

Fingerprint

Inspection
Game
Operator
Incentives
Server
Equilibrium Analysis
Externalities
Vulnerability
Congestion
Infrastructure
Electronics
Servers
Subset
Toll collection
Class
Costs
Interaction
Communication

Keywords

  • Asymmetric Information Games
  • Cyber-Physical Systems Security
  • Smart Highway Systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Wu, M., Jin, L., Amin, S., & Jaillet, P. (2019). Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018 (pp. 2728-2734). [8619109] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2018-December). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619109

Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations. / Wu, Manxi; Jin, Li; Amin, Saurabh; Jaillet, Patrick.

2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 2728-2734 8619109 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2018-December).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Wu, M, Jin, L, Amin, S & Jaillet, P 2019, Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations. in 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018., 8619109, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 2018-December, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2728-2734, 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018, Miami, United States, 12/17/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619109
Wu M, Jin L, Amin S, Jaillet P. Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 2728-2734. 8619109. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619109
Wu, Manxi ; Jin, Li ; Amin, Saurabh ; Jaillet, Patrick. / Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations. 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 2728-2734 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).
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