Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Olivier Gossner

doi:10.3982/ECTA9385

Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Olivier Gossner

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1627-1641
Number of pages	15
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	79
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9385
State	Published - Sep 2011

Keywords

Incomplete information
Relative entropy
Repeated games
Reputation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.3982/ECTA9385

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KW - Repeated games

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Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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