Abstract
We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of non-overlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory "parents" to laboratory "children") can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 498-529 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2003 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics