Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect

Ernesto Reuben, Frans van Winden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This is an experimental study of negative reciprocity in the case of multiple reciprocators. We use a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which responders are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders' decisions, beliefs, and emotions. Our main findings are (1) friends punish the proposer more than strangers, (2) friends are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication), and (3) both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders' emotional reactions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)34-53
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume92
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2008

Keywords

  • Affect
  • Experiment
  • Reciprocity
  • Social norms
  • Social ties

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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