Special Session: Potentially Leaky Controller: Examining Cache Side-Channel Attacks in Programmable Logic Controllers

Dimitrios Tychalas, Michail Maniatakos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have evolved during the last decade following a new paradigm in the fourth industrial revolution, defined by the flexibility provided from open-source software such as Embedded Linux. In the same time-span, cache side-channel attacks have been identified as a prominent threat to any kind of computer system, facilitating highly stealthy confidentiality compromising attacks that enable information exfiltration. Given their crucial position in the systems they facilitate, ICS can be exploited to extract highly sensitive information that can compromise the system itself and, by extension, the infrastructure they belong to. Thus, in this paper we will examine the threat cache side-channel attacks pose in modern ICS. We will introduce the current landscape of side-channel threats that can target processors found in ICS, the potentially vulnerable points for information extraction across an ICS system stack as well as the nature of the information itself, and discuss viable countermeasures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2020 IEEE 38th International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2020
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages33-36
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781728197104
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2020
Event38th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2020 - Hartford, United States
Duration: Oct 18 2020Oct 21 2020

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE International Conference on Computer Design: VLSI in Computers and Processors
Volume2020-October
ISSN (Print)1063-6404

Conference

Conference38th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2020
CountryUnited States
CityHartford
Period10/18/2010/21/20

Keywords

  • Embedded systems security
  • Industrial Control
  • Side-channel attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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