Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Mohsen Nader Tehrani, Murat Uysal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function in terms of different parameters for secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism for non-identical channel allocation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, SUs can bid for a single channel while in the other one, SUs can bid for a bundle of two channels. Our numerical results demonstrate significant revenue increase for the auctioneer and bidders in comparison with the conventional auction mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2011 IEEE 22nd International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC'11
Pages406-410
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event2011 IEEE 22nd International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC'11 - Toronto, ON, Canada
Duration: Sep 11 2011Sep 14 2011

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC

Conference

Conference2011 IEEE 22nd International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC'11
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto, ON
Period9/11/119/14/11

Keywords

  • Channel allocation
  • Cognitive radio networks
  • Spectrum trading
  • Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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