Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Mohsen Nader Tehrani, Murat Uysal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for exclusive usage spectrum access model in cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function which depends on channel capacity, delay sensitive and delay-insensitive data traffics of secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism for non-identical channel allocation among r-minded bidders in two different cases. In the first case, the SUs are r-minded but they can submit bid only for single channels. In the second case, the SUs are r-minded and they can submit bid for bundles of channels. We show that the first case is solvable in polynomial time but in the other one, the problem of determining auction outcomes is NP-hard. We propose two sub-optimal methods for solving this problem, namely greedy algorithm and randomized rounding linear programming (LP) relaxation algorithm. Due to the sub-optimal nature of solutions in the second case, VCG mechanism is not truthful anymore and the SUs can lie to maximize their utilities. To address this, we propose an auction mechanism with limited truthfulness property based on an iterative greedy algorithm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6594783
Pages (from-to)5100-5109
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Issue number10
StatePublished - Oct 2013


  • Channel allocation
  • Cognitive radio networks
  • Spectrum trading
  • Truth-telling
  • Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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