Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

Joyee Deb; Ehud Kalai

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.001

Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

Joyee Deb, Ehud Kalai

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the consequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1041-1055
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	157
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.001
State	Published - May 1 2015

Keywords

Bayesian nash equilibria
Ex-post nash equilibria
Hindsight stability
Large games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.001

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KW - Large games

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Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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