Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

Joyee Deb, Ehud Kalai

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the consequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1041-1055
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    StatePublished - May 1 2015


    • Bayesian nash equilibria
    • Ex-post nash equilibria
    • Hindsight stability
    • Large games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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