Stable networking games

Hamidou Tembine; Eitan Altman; Rachid Elazouzi; Yezekael Hayel

doi:10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686

Stable networking games

Hamidou Tembine, Eitan Altman, Rachid Elazouzi, Yezekael Hayel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

We study a class of population game frameworks called stable games, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007). We give several examples of applications of stable population games in the context of wireless networks including resource allocation, impact of malicious users in cognitive radio networks and power control. We model and analyze a base station assignment problem and interference control scenarios in heterogenous wireless networks as a non-zero sum stable game. We show that the resource selection game has a unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and a unique correlated ESS. We give a class of evolutionary game dynamics to lead to the ESS.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing
Pages	1124-1131
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686
State	Published - 2008
Event	46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing - Monticello, IL, United States Duration: Sep 24 2008 → Sep 26 2008

Publication series

Name	46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing

Other

Other	46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing
Country/Territory	United States
City	Monticello, IL
Period	9/24/08 → 9/26/08

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Software
Control and Systems Engineering
Communication

Access to Document

10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686

Cite this

Tembine, H, Altman, E, Elazouzi, R & Hayel, Y 2008, Stable networking games. in 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing., 4797686, 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, pp. 1124-1131, 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Monticello, IL, United States, 9/24/08. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686

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abstract = "We study a class of population game frameworks called stable games, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007). We give several examples of applications of stable population games in the context of wireless networks including resource allocation, impact of malicious users in cognitive radio networks and power control. We model and analyze a base station assignment problem and interference control scenarios in heterogenous wireless networks as a non-zero sum stable game. We show that the resource selection game has a unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and a unique correlated ESS. We give a class of evolutionary game dynamics to lead to the ESS.",

author = "Hamidou Tembine and Eitan Altman and Rachid Elazouzi and Yezekael Hayel",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686",

language = "English (US)",

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series = "46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing",

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note = "46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing ; Conference date: 24-09-2008 Through 26-09-2008",

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AU - Elazouzi, Rachid

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AB - We study a class of population game frameworks called stable games, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007). We give several examples of applications of stable population games in the context of wireless networks including resource allocation, impact of malicious users in cognitive radio networks and power control. We model and analyze a base station assignment problem and interference control scenarios in heterogenous wireless networks as a non-zero sum stable game. We show that the resource selection game has a unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and a unique correlated ESS. We give a class of evolutionary game dynamics to lead to the ESS.

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DO - 10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797686

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T3 - 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing

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BT - 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing

T2 - 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing

Y2 - 24 September 2008 through 26 September 2008

ER -

Stable networking games

Abstract

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