State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game

Quanyan Zhu, Lacra Pavel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The static nature of the noncooperative power control game model in optical networks makes it difficult to study and design an appropriate pricing scheme. In this paper, we derive a first-order best response dynamics from the game-theoretical model and formulate a general multi-input and multi-output (MIMO) state-space model. We use classical linear system theory to explain the controllability of the pricing and the observability of the power states. We use the output regulator theory to design a pricing policy for the network for a given optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC
Edition1 PART 1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: Jul 6 2008Jul 11 2008

Publication series

NameIFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)
Number1 PART 1
Volume17
ISSN (Print)1474-6670

Other

Other17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC
CountryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period7/6/087/11/08

Keywords

  • Remote and distributed control
  • Telecommunication-based automation systems
  • The internet

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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  • Cite this

    Zhu, Q., & Pavel, L. (2008). State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game. In Proceedings of the 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC (1 PART 1 ed.). (IFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline); Vol. 17, No. 1 PART 1). https://doi.org/10.3182/20080706-5-KR-1001.2096