State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game

Quanyan Zhu; Lacra Pavel

doi:10.3182/20080706-5-KR-1001.2096

State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game

Quanyan Zhu, Lacra Pavel

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The static nature of the noncooperative power control game model in optical networks makes it difficult to study and design an appropriate pricing scheme. In this paper, we derive a first-order best response dynamics from the game-theoretical model and formulate a general multi-input and multi-output (MIMO) state-space model. We use classical linear system theory to explain the controllability of the pricing and the observability of the power states. We use the output regulator theory to design a pricing policy for the network for a given optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC
Edition	1 PART 1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3182/20080706-5-KR-1001.2096
State	Published - 2008
Event	17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC - Seoul, Korea, Republic of Duration: Jul 6 2008 → Jul 11 2008

Publication series

Name	IFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)
Number	1 PART 1
Volume	17
ISSN (Print)	1474-6670

Other

Other	17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC
Country/Territory	Korea, Republic of
City	Seoul
Period	7/6/08 → 7/11/08

Keywords

Remote and distributed control
Telecommunication-based automation systems
The internet

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Control and Systems Engineering

Access to Document

10.3182/20080706-5-KR-1001.2096

Cite this

Zhu, Q & Pavel, L 2008, State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game. in Proceedings of the 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC. 1 PART 1 edn, IFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline), no. 1 PART 1, vol. 17, 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC, Seoul, Korea, Republic of, 7/6/08. https://doi.org/10.3182/20080706-5-KR-1001.2096

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abstract = "The static nature of the noncooperative power control game model in optical networks makes it difficult to study and design an appropriate pricing scheme. In this paper, we derive a first-order best response dynamics from the game-theoretical model and formulate a general multi-input and multi-output (MIMO) state-space model. We use classical linear system theory to explain the controllability of the pricing and the observability of the power states. We use the output regulator theory to design a pricing policy for the network for a given optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target.",

keywords = "Remote and distributed control, Telecommunication-based automation systems, The internet",

author = "Quanyan Zhu and Lacra Pavel",

note = "Funding Information: ★ This work was supported in part by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.; 17th World Congress, International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC ; Conference date: 06-07-2008 Through 11-07-2008",

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PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - The static nature of the noncooperative power control game model in optical networks makes it difficult to study and design an appropriate pricing scheme. In this paper, we derive a first-order best response dynamics from the game-theoretical model and formulate a general multi-input and multi-output (MIMO) state-space model. We use classical linear system theory to explain the controllability of the pricing and the observability of the power states. We use the output regulator theory to design a pricing policy for the network for a given optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target.

AB - The static nature of the noncooperative power control game model in optical networks makes it difficult to study and design an appropriate pricing scheme. In this paper, we derive a first-order best response dynamics from the game-theoretical model and formulate a general multi-input and multi-output (MIMO) state-space model. We use classical linear system theory to explain the controllability of the pricing and the observability of the power states. We use the output regulator theory to design a pricing policy for the network for a given optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target.

KW - Remote and distributed control

KW - Telecommunication-based automation systems

KW - The internet

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State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR Nash game

Abstract

Publication series

Other

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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