Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

Hamidou Tembine; Eitan Altman; Rachid Elazouzi; Yezekael Hayel

doi:10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359

Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

Hamidou Tembine, Eitan Altman, Rachid Elazouzi, Yezekael Hayel

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous re- ward which depends on its state and the population's pro- file, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless net- works with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolu- Tionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equi- libria.

Original language	English (US)
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359
State	Published - 2008
Event	3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008 - Athens, Greece Duration: Oct 20 2008 → Oct 24 2008

Other

Other	3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008
Country/Territory	Greece
City	Athens
Period	10/20/08 → 10/24/08

Keywords

Access control
Markov decision process
Population games
Power control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Instrumentation

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10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359

Cite this

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title = "Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints",

abstract = "This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous re- ward which depends on its state and the population's pro- file, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless net- works with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolu- Tionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equi- libria.",

keywords = "Access control, Markov decision process, Population games, Power control",

author = "Hamidou Tembine and Eitan Altman and Rachid Elazouzi and Yezekael Hayel",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359",

language = "English (US)",

note = "3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008 ; Conference date: 20-10-2008 Through 24-10-2008",

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T1 - Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

AU - Tembine, Hamidou

AU - Altman, Eitan

AU - Elazouzi, Rachid

AU - Hayel, Yezekael

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous re- ward which depends on its state and the population's pro- file, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless net- works with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolu- Tionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equi- libria.

AB - This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous re- ward which depends on its state and the population's pro- file, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless net- works with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolu- Tionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equi- libria.

KW - Access control

KW - Markov decision process

KW - Population games

KW - Power control

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DO - 10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2008.4359

M3 - Paper

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T2 - 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008

Y2 - 20 October 2008 through 24 October 2008

ER -

Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

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Keywords

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