Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

Hamidou Tembine, Eitan Altman, Rachid Elazouzi, Yezekael Hayel

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous re- ward which depends on its state and the population's pro- file, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless net- works with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolu- Tionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equi- libria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008 - Athens, Greece
Duration: Oct 20 2008Oct 24 2008

Other

Other3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008
CountryGreece
CityAthens
Period10/20/0810/24/08

Keywords

  • Access control
  • Markov decision process
  • Population games
  • Power control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Instrumentation

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